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The Mutable Nature of Risk and Acceptability: A Hybrid
Risk Governance Framework
Catherine Mei Ling Wong∗
This article focuses on the fluid nature of risk problems and the challenges it presents to
establishing acceptability in risk governance. It introduces an actor-network theory (ANT)
perspective as a way to deal with the mutable nature of risk controversies and the configu-
ration of stakeholders. To translate this into a practicable framework, the article proposes
a hybrid risk governance framework that combines ANT with integrative risk governance,
deliberative democracy, and responsive regulation. This addresses a number of the limita-
tions in existing risk governance models, including: (1) the lack of more substantive public
participation throughout the lifecycle of a project; (2) hijacking of deliberative forums by
particular groups; and (3) the treatment of risk problems and their associated stakeholders
as immutable entities. The framework constitutes a five-stage process of co-selection, co-
design, co-planning, and co-regulation to facilitate the co-production of collective interests
and knowledge, build capacities, and strengthen accountability in the process. The aims of
this article are twofold: conceptually, it introduces a framework of risk governance that ac-
counts for the mutable nature of risk problems and configuration of stakeholders. In practice,
this article offers risk managers and practitioners of risk governance a set of procedures with
which to operationalize this conceptual approach to risk and stakeholder engagement.
KEYWORDS: Actor-network theory; deliberative democracy; responsive regulation; risk governance
1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMWITH
RISK AND ACCEPTABILITY
Before the Fukushima disaster in March 2011,
nuclear power was scarcely considered a contro-
versial issue in Japan and beyond. Indeed, it was
upheld as a key source of clean, nonemitting energy,
supplying 30% of Japan’s electricity needs. Its risks
were largely accepted, or at least un-debated in
the public sphere. This changed drastically in the
wake of the disaster, with tens of thousands taking
to the streets in protest against government plans
to restart some of its nuclear reactors.(1) Two years
on, protest dwindled to a mere 200 when a local
governor approved the resumption of two reactors
in the Sendai power stations. In fact, the residents
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of Satsumasendai hosting the nuclear power plants
voted yes to restarting the reactors.(2) Whether this
is a reflection of the ebb and flow of public sentiment
in catastrophic risk events or an indication of actual
improvements to risk governance in the industry,
this underscores the mutable nature of risk problems
and their acceptability.
Reflecting on this mutable1 nature of risk, this
article explores what the implications are for risk
1This means that the objects, people, ideas, narratives, etc. that
constitute a risk problem are not stable but fluid and ever chang-
ing. This draws on Latour’s (1987) concept of “immutable mo-
biles,” which are objects like maps, photos, diagrams, etc. that can
be easily transportable (i.e. mobile) without changing the original
characteristics of the things/ideas they represent. This concept of
mutability has since been expanded and applied to the conceptu-
alization of power and organizations as emergent network effects
that are unstable and need constant reenactment to maintain the
semblance of stability (see, for example, Law(3) and Alcadipani
and Hassard(4)). This article applies this idea of “mutability” to
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governance in practice, guided by two interrelated
conceptual and practical questions: How can risk
governance deal with the mutable character of risk
problems and acceptability? How does this change
public participation in risk governance in practice?
Deeply connected to this is the problem of what
constitutes acceptable risk and how stakeholders
might arrive at an agreement. Typically dominated
by technical perspectives,(6) it is often the assump-
tion in the risk analysis literature that better data
lead to better decisions on what is an acceptable
level of risk. The long history of risk controver-
sies from biotechnology and industrial accidents to
climate change, however, show that better techni-
cal risk assessment alone neither prevents disasters
nor translates into public acceptability. Even the ex-
perts disagree; actors are fluid; conditions variable;
and social, ecological, and technological systems in-
creasingly interconnected. Indeed, risk acceptability
is less about more accurate probabilities than it is
about subjective values and the perception of dis-
tributive justice.(7) More reliable technical data also
cannot address weak safety cultures;(8) the pressures
of treadmill production(9) to cut corners and prior-
itize production over maintenance; and the ways in
which organizational cultures filter information and
skew so-called objective decision making.(10)
Risk governance attempts to address some of
these limitations by integrating the public into
decision-making processes. In doing so, the scope of
risk assessment is widened to account for societal val-
ues in decisions about risk, thereby also increasing
the likelihood of public acceptability. Accountability
is not just a one-way communication of data to the
public but about procedural fairness, social learning,
and mechanisms for lay interrogation, which not only
enhances public trust, but also improves the qual-
ity of technical assessment.(11) Major contributions
have come from integrative risk governance,(7,12) de-
liberative democracy,(13,14) and the related subfield of
smart/responsive regulation.(15–17)
These perspectives offer valuable insights to how
public participation can produce better risk deci-
sions, but face a number of conceptual and practi-
cal limitations. Firstly, public participation remains
limited to preimplementation framing of the prob-
lem and preestimating risks largely aimed at es-
tablishing political legitimacy. The actual work of
planning, monitoring, and managing risk in the con-
the analysis of risk problems and the organization of risk gover-
nance in practice.
struction and operation phases of a project2 remains
the prerogative of technical experts. Existing risk
governance models, therefore, offer few institutional
arrangements and coordination mechanisms that fa-
cilitate public involvement in risk monitoring and
management throughout the lifecycle of a project.
This is problematic because production pres-
sures influence decisions on timelines, maintenance,
and safety; organizational cultures interfere with
safety cultures; regulatory capture seeps in; and tech-
nical experts are constrained by incomplete data.
These sources of more mundane risks (e.g., routine
(over)release of pollutants into the environment, un-
derreporting of incidents, ignoring warning signals,
etc.) ultimately contribute to catastrophic risk events
(e.g., industrial accidents like the Deepwater Hori-
zon oil spill in 2010; epidemics like the mad cow dis-
ease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 1987 and
the swine flu in 2009; or a combination of natural
and industrial disasters as seen in the Fukushima nu-
clear disaster).(18) Public participation, therefore, is
necessary not just for the purpose of preimplementa-
tion legitimacy but postimplementation accountabil-
ity throughout the lifespan of a project. AsWynne(19)
notes, companies are trusted as long as they are well
policed. Greater public participation in the policing
of industries, therefore, has the double benefit of re-
ducing risks and enhancing public trust.
Secondly, risks and benefits tend to be treated as
mutually exclusive, which reduces discussions on ac-
ceptability to a measure of what is the “right” level
of risk-benefit tradeoffs and the acceptable amount
of compensation for the “losers.”3 This overshadows
other discussions that explore ways to generate more
positive impacts of change for all stakeholders.(18)
Public deliberation, therefore, needs to go beyond a
narrow focus on minimizing risks and trading them
off with narrowly defined (monetary) benefits to in-
clude maximizing benefits in ways that can build
(local) capacities and enhance resilience to risks.
2This article uses “projects” as the context in which risk gover-
nance activities occur. These are development projects that often
involve the application of science and technology and pose social
and environmental risks.
3This mode of thinking is increasingly gaining traction even in the
business world. Porter and Kramer’s(20) concept of “shared val-
ues,” first published inHarvard Business Review, 2011, presents a
shift in business thinking away from business vs. society tradeoffs
towards policies and operating practices that enhance the com-
petitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the
economic and social conditions in the communities in which it
operates.
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Finally, existing models generally treat risk
problems and the configuration of affected par-
ties/stakeholders as immutable entities. Efforts are,
therefore, aimed at pinning down a definition of
the problem and locking in arrangements with a
fixed set of stakeholders/representatives. Risk prob-
lems are, however, more often than not, mutable
entities: stakeholders drop out and new ones join in
along with new sets of concerns and interests; old
claims are displaced by new knowledge; technologies
evolve; ecological systems intervene; and new laws
get drafted or old ones are invoked more actively by
new entrants. Current risk governance frameworks
are ill-equipped to deal with this ever-changing con-
figuration of actors (human and nonhuman) in a risk
problem. While it is well established in the literature
that the acceptability of risk is subjective and vari-
able from person to person, the challenge remains as
to how such variabilities can be accounted for in the
practice of risk governance.
To address these challenges, this article in-
troduces an ANT perspective on risk governance
whereby risk problems and acceptability are con-
ceived as unstable network effects. This conceptual
modification is then translated into a hybrid risk gov-
ernance framework that practitioners in risk gover-
nance (i.e., regulators, consultants, risk managers,
conflict mediators, researchers, etc.) can use. The
aims of this article are twofold: conceptually, it pro-
poses a framework of risk governance that accounts
for the mutable nature of risk problems and the con-
figuration of stakeholders. In practice, this article
offers risk managers and practitioners of risk gover-
nance a set of procedures with which to operational-
ize this reconceptualization of risk and better inte-
grate affected publics in decision-making processes.
The model proposed here is based on a larger
empirical study on nuclear power in India after the
Fukushima disaster, and is thus most relevant to that
industry.(21) But it is also applicable to a wide range
of industrial sectors such as the mining and energy
industries, manufacturing, agribusinesses, etc., where
operations pose both mundane social and environ-
mental risks that can lead to catastrophic risk events.
The model is also targeted at developing countries,
where industrial development is still growing rapidly
and institutions of governance and public partici-
pation are still relatively weak. Ideally, the model
should be applied to projects that are in the concep-
tual/planning stage, but it can also be used in cases
where projects have already been implemented but
are facing significant public/local resistance.
2. RISK GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
2.1. The Adaptive and Integrative Model
The concept of risk governance is concerned
with a wide range of actors, institutions, political cul-
tures, processes, and mechanisms that influence how
risk information is collected, analyzed, and commu-
nicated. Importantly, it seeks to create a set of ar-
rangements in which decisions on risk can be made
collaboratively and in coordination between multi-
ple stakeholders.(7) The “adaptive and integrative
model” developed by Renn and colleagues(12,22,23) at-
tempts to address risk acceptability by integrating
both realist and constructivist perspectives in risk
governance. This combines scientific analysis by tech-
nical experts with stakeholder and public inputs at
varying degrees depending on the type of risk prob-
lem: complex, uncertain, ambiguous, or a combina-
tion of all.(24) Public participation starts early in a
project’s lifecycle at the “preestimation” stage where
risks are framed with a key objective of establish-
ing a consensus on the “right” balance of risks and
benefits; pros and cons.(12) This gives political legiti-
macy to technical decisions on risk by reflecting pub-
lic preferences, thus establishing acceptability.
This model, however, is limited in a number of
ways. Firstly, the actual location of lay publics within
the framework and the forms of participation still
reflects a bias towards expert knowledge and for-
mal organizations. Public input is limited to the dis-
cursive framing of the problem and choosing among
options preselected for them by risk managers and
technical experts who still dominate the process of
risk estimation, evaluation, and management.(25) The
main work of knowledge production is still largely
monopolized by technical experts and lay/local ex-
pert knowledge tends to be marginal or underuti-
lized after a project commences. This privileging of
expert knowledge is problematic because it narrows
the scope of analysis, estimations of risk, and the
general conceptualization of what falls within the
realm of possible hazards and impacts that is con-
sidered in risk analysis. The limited scope of public
participation also lends itself to the perception that
it is tokenistic and merely an add-on to decision-
making processes, which in turn increases cynicism
and distrust,(11) ultimately undermining the goal of
establishing legitimacy and acceptability.
Secondly, the inclusion of public interests largely
takes the form of interdisciplinary representation
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by social scientists, economists, and formal orga-
nizations like NGOs. These participants are still
experts in nontechnical fields of science, whereas
involvement by directly affected but informally
organized local/rural communities—i.e., affected
publics—remains limited. Direct involvement by
these stakeholders is important because they pos-
sess knowledge of the local environment and man-
agement strategies that have been developed and
adapted over generations. Such forms of knowledge
may fall outside formal scientific intellectual frame-
works but can ultimately prove to be more effective
and useful when applied to the local context.(26)
2.2. Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy, like the “adaptive and
integrative model,” is concerned with collective
choice mechanisms such as deliberative polls, citi-
zen’s juries, planning cells, and consensus forums —
collectives that Renn categorizes into “pools of
instruments.”(13,24) But deliberative democracy de-
viates from Renn’s model in three significant ways.
Firstly, less importance is placed on establishing a
consensus on the definition of risk than on the pro-
cesses that enable collective interests and shared
values to emerge. The function of deliberative plat-
forms, therefore, is to discover new procedures, tech-
niques, concepts, and institutions that can be used to
pull the social together in whatever (unstable) form
they may take.(27) Discursive representation is a con-
cept Dryzek et al.(28) introduce to ensure that all rel-
evant (and especially marginal) discourses are repre-
sented using a variety of methods, including random
selection, the Q method, in-depth interviews, and fo-
cus groups.
Secondly, lay publics play a more central role
in knowledge production. Conceptually, public par-
ticipation is not limited to framing of the problem
but is deeply embedded within project development
processes from analyzing impacts and proposing al-
ternatives, to monitoring planned interventions. Em-
phasis is also on empowering affected communities
through capacity building, and developing social cap-
ital (e.g., social networks and trust) in the process.(29)
Finally, the physical and social dimensions of risk are
treated as processes that are inextricably linked in
what Dryzek(14) calls “ecological intersubjectivity.”
The human and nonhuman worlds, social and natural
systems, ecological and social wellbeing are, there-
fore, treated as mutually embedded in the assessment
of risks and potential impacts.
Deliberative approaches, however, face a num-
ber of challenges in practice. Without proper imple-
mentation, deliberative processes can be hijacked by
lobby groups or those with strongly held views.(30)
This can stifle discussions and skew outcomes in fa-
vor of specific group interests at the expense of the
wider social good. The demands of certain lobby
groups may also not be aligned with the common
good and scuttle genuine attempts at engaging local
communities.(11) Indeed, Dryzek and Niemeyer(28)
acknowledge that strong lobby groups with larger
membership may distort the representation of dis-
courses but offer no strategies for how this can be
mitigated. There is also a lack of practicable tools
and concrete processes through which the ideals of
deliberation can be incorporated into existing risk
governance arrangements. Overall, critics of delib-
erative approaches argue that, done improperly, de-
liberation may instead exacerbate risk levels, intro-
duce inefficiencies, stabilize unequal power relations,
and produce trivial results.(24,31) This article acknowl-
edges these limitations, but contends that steps can
be taken to circumvent them (see Section 3).
2.3. Smart/Responsive Regulation
Smart/responsive regulation is not often asso-
ciated with risk governance, but presents particular
insights to alternative ways for establishing account-
ability by industry vis-a`-vis the regulatory process.
It contends that simple state-market and regulation-
deregulation dichotomies inhibit attempts to find
solutions that draw on the best of both approaches.
Indeed, industries, it argues, can be effective (com-
mercial) “third parties” in self-regulation4 through
a mix of supportive mechanisms that enable and
empower them to set their own standards and
achieve them, while maintaining state regulatory
agencies’ authority to impose sanctions if they
fail to solve the problem or produce the desired
goals.(15,17) Supportive mechanisms are crucial
and can include co-regulation, environmental
audits, liability rules for banks and insurers, en-
vironmental reporting, community right-to-know
legislation, deliberative processes, and good neigh-
bor agreements.(32) Importantly, smart regulation
relies significantly on wider industry peer pres-
sure to ensure companies comply with standards
4It is important to note that “self-regulation” refers to the process
by which an organized group regulates the behaviour of its mem-
bers and not to an individual firm or company regulating itself.(32)
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and norms, and the ability of regulators and
industry to jointly negotiate targets and strategies
and provide external verification. Regulation is,
thus, a responsive process, providing freedoms to
industry to negotiate targets and achieve them,
rewarding good performance with more incentives,
but imposing state/legislative sanctions when targets
are not met.
Examples have been cited in a number of cases,
including the chemical industry’s Responsible Care
Programme;(33) the Institute of Nuclear Power Op-
erations (INPO) created by the nuclear industry
in the United States after the Three Mile Island
disaster;(34) and the so-called KBS program started
by the Swedish nuclear industry to deal with the
problem of nuclear waste management.(35,36) But
even these successes are not immutable. Operators
have resisted the use of “communitarian social con-
trol” by the INPO(34) and the KBS is in constant
negotiation with the public and state regulators to
maintain conflict-free operation of nuclear activities.
Indeed, profit-driven industries are not naturally
predisposed to regulate themselves and success de-
pends on a wide range of supporting conditions, in-
cluding an independent regulator with political clout,
supportive legislation, an informed public, environ-
mental feedback loops that threaten business sus-
tainability, etc. Like deliberative democracy, proper
implementation is crucial, which has proven com-
plex in practice. Communication between the regu-
lator and industry is key but prone to break down.
Nielsen and Parker,(37) for example, found in their
study of anti-competition offenders in Australia that
communication failed when different regulators dealt
with the offender at different times in relation to
different matters. Similar problems arose when dif-
ferent people within the business organization were
communicating with the regulator at different stages
and had different reactions that affected whether the
business as whole changed its attitude and behav-
ior. Self-regulation can also slow the pace of reform,
as in the case of Australia’s Retail Electronic Pay-
ment Systems,(38) which was not properly tailored to
the nature of the industry and was scuttled by over-
lapping regulatory functions between the Reserve
Bank of Australia and the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission.
Nevertheless, smart regulation presents an alter-
native perspective on the source of accountability
(which has implications for risk acceptability) and the
role industries can play given the right incentives and
institutional settings.
2.4. ANT and Risk Governance
ANT is not often associated with risk gov-
ernance but offers new insights by reframing the
function of deliberation, the organization of public
participation, and the (mutable) nature of risk prob-
lems. From an ANT perspective, the acceptability
of risk is itself mutable and participatory platforms
are a loosely defined space where the configuration
of participants is fluid and knowledge is incomplete.
The function of deliberation, therefore, is to facilitate
the co-production of knowledge, construct a commu-
nity of shared fate, and create a pool of shared re-
sources that all stakeholders can tap into to maximize
benefits and minimize risks. Acceptability of risk by
affected publics is produced by developing a project
as a common enterprise that brings out the shared
interests and identities of all stakeholders. This re-
quires affected publics to be integrated into the full
spectrum of risk governance activities, from risk esti-
mation to monitoring and management.
Stakeholders are not predefined/selected by risk
managers but are an emergent, heterogeneous con-
gregation of “concerned groups.”(39) This can include
government regulators, industry (third parties), and
affected lay publics — organized or otherwise. Stake-
holder groups are also unstable entities, meaning
their identities are problematic and their interests are
the outcomes and not the causes of action itself. The
function of participatory processes, therefore, is to
steer discussions towards the production of shared
discursive identities and interests. The reconfigura-
tion of relevant stakeholders may also evolve over
time. Participatory settings must, therefore, be flexi-
ble enough to allow new actors to join in and old ones
to drop out.
Similarly, risk problems are conceived as mu-
table entities and risk acceptability is at best tem-
porary and incomplete. The risk governance frame-
work, therefore, must have a reflexive component
that constantly reevaluates what the problems are,
who the (new) stakeholders might be, and what their
interests are. This approach favors adjustments and
corrections as the project develops. Indeed, changes
are not interpreted as dishonesty or unreliability, but
an evolution/reconfiguration of the problem.
This naturally poses some challenges in practice.
Most significantly, the success of such an approach
requires a significant change in stakeholder attitudes
towards accepting risk problems and their solutions
as unstable and fluid in nature and translating that
into practical measures. Communication between
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experts and lay persons is also difficult, often requir-
ing a completely different way of thinking. Indeed,
the emergence of science communication as a new
field of study is indication of the enormity of this
challenge. Callon’s idea of concern groups emerg-
ing organically and then somehow organizing into
a hybrid forum also overlooks barriers from preex-
isting institutions and bounded rationalities(40) that
prevent co-learning and co-production of knowledge,
identities, and interests. Lastly, creating a framework
that is flexible enough to deal with the mutable na-
ture of risk problems and its stakeholders may also
prove difficult. To date, no such framework exists.
The concept of hybrid forums proposed by Callon
and colleagues(39,41,42) largely represents the ideals
discussed above, but it remains more of a conceptual
artifact without a comprehensive framework for how
that may be implemented more systematically.
Nevertheless, ANT does offer the conceptual
tools to deal with the mutable nature of risk prob-
lems, acceptability, and their configuration of ac-
tors. This reorganizes the priorities of deliberation;
takes the pressure off forcing a consensus on fixed
goals/definitions; and introduces new actors, knowl-
edge, and mechanisms that can offer alternative so-
lutions. The challenge is progressing from conceptual
reframing to an actionable framework.
3. A HYBRID RISK GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK
The proposed “hybrid risk governance frame-
work” is named as such, drawing on Callon et al.’s(39)
“hybrid forum” concept, but also to reflect the hy-
bridization of ANT, integrative, deliberative, and re-
sponsive approaches to risk governance. The frame-
work is not the answer to all the limitations cited
in the previous section, but proposes some steps to-
wards dealing with the four broad constrains in ex-
isting models: (1) limited public participation to rep-
resentatives of formal organization such as NGOs,
research institutions, social scientists, etc.; (2) hijack-
ing by dominant/interest groups; (3) lack of mecha-
nisms for public participation throughout the lifecy-
cle of a project; and (4) the mutable character of risk
problems and their associated stakeholders.
The framework, does two keys things differently:
firstly, public participation is more than a process
to legitimize a project. It is situated at the heart
of decision making and knowledge production as
means to expand the scope of information avail-
able to inform democratic debate; draw on local
knowledge not privy to external experts; provide ex-
ternal monitoring; and better understand how pub-
lic attitudes and perceptions are likely to shape
responses (and resistance) to proposed change.(27)
Including affected publics in decision-making pro-
cesses, therefore, helps to solve many barriers to
change, improve resilience, and ultimately produce
better decision outcomes. Secondly, new participants
are able to join in and old ones to drop out at each
stage of deliberation in this model, thereby allow-
ing for the configuration of stakeholders to shift and
change as the problem evolves.
The framework is aimed at local-level imple-
mentation of development/industrial projects. The
target participants and audiences are, therefore, lo-
cal communities, local governments, and plant- or
factory-level directors and senior managers (i.e.,
local branches of project proponents). This may
require decentralizing decision making in the corpo-
rate structure and divesting autonomy to local op-
erating plant directors to engage and negotiate with
local communities on behalf of the parent company.
This is both pragmatic and strategic for project pro-
ponents on two fronts: firstly, officials and managers
at the local level have better knowledge of the unique
conditions and contexts of the locale. Secondly, plant
directors have greater vested interests in meaningful
engagement with local communities than an execu-
tive in the headquarters as the success of their op-
erations depends on it. Other institutional support
may also be needed to incentivize or mandate the
implementation of this framework. Some already ex-
ist in the form of legislated requirements for public
consultation prior to project implementation and so-
cial impact assessments.5 But additional institutional
pressure can come from the private sector such as
the insurance industry by increasing premiums of
companies that fail to demonstrate adequate public
participation.
5India, for example, has a law that requires companies to con-
duct an environmental impact assessment to be approved by the
Ministry of Environment and Forestry before any project can
commence. Implementation, however, is weak, corruption is rife,
and the social impacts poorly assessed. Under this framework,
other laws such as the recently amended Land Acquisition Act
passed in 2014 can be brought in to strengthen institutional gov-
ernance. This amended law brings in stricter norms to land acqui-
sitions and significantly increases landowners’ compensation. It
also specifies special protection to Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes where additional compensation is mandated and the
consent of the village council must be acquired for any land ac-
quisition to be approved.(47)
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The framework consists of five stages (see Fig. 6
for overview) to be implemented in a roundtable set-
ting with an independent external moderator skilled
in conflict management and communication. Guiding
questions are provided to frame discussions at each
stage. Onus for convening this forum is on the project
proponents and has to begin at the earliest (i.e., plan-
ning) stages of the project.
3.1. Stage 1: Co-Selection
Co-selection (see Fig. 1) is primarily aimed at de-
mocratizing representation by letting affected publics
select their own representatives. This is particularly
important for rural communities in developing coun-
tries where leadership structures are not formally in-
stitutionalized and ethnic minorities and women are
underrepresented. Stakeholders are characterized by
three broad categories: (affected) publics, govern-
ment, and industry.6 Each category has a list of rep-
resentation criteria that will give an indication of the
individual’s authority to speak on behalf of the larger
community/organization (see Table I).
The number of representatives for each category
should ideally be kept small to keep discussions man-
ageable, with a greater proportion accorded to af-
fected publics. To avoid the problem of hijacking
by lobby groups with political agendas that may not
be in the interest of the larger collective, NGOs or
grass roots organizations that wish to represent the
community must be nominated by residents. Prior-
ity should be given to participants who are nomi-
nated by the community directly affect by the project,
and can be individuals who are already elected mem-
bers of the community such as village chiefs, may-
ors, and council members. Representation by female
members of the community should be emphasized if
they are not already in positions of leadership. In-
formation must be provided to the public in advance
with sufficient time for dissemination and discussion
within the community.
3.2. Stage 2: Co-Design
The objective of the co-design stage (see Fig. 2)
is to facilitate the identification and alignment of
goals and interests of project proponents and af-
fected publics. The needs of the two groups may con-
6Note that state regulators are important stakeholders in deliber-
ation, but their roles are often determined by legislation and not
a subject of deliberation.
Fig. 1. Co-selection process.
flict in some areas but coincide in others. However,
conflict tends to overshadow convergence in pub-
lic debate. For example, the polarization of the nu-
clear debate in India (and beyond) between those
who were either for or against nuclear power after
the Fukushima disaster overshadowed the voices of
moderation on both sides that called for more demo-
cratic process, scientific humility, and a broader focus
on sustainable development and human security.(43)
This stage of deliberation, therefore, is aimed at
avoiding simplistic “winner-loser,” “for-against” di-
chotomies at the earliest stage of the project. This is
done by scoping out the areas of converging interests,
identifying synergies among all stakeholders, and in-
tegrating them at the design stage. The guiding ques-
tions for deliberation at this stage, therefore, can be
formulated as:
1. What are the project goals/interests?
2. What are the affected communities’ goals and
interests?
These questions are aimed at opening discus-
sions into what social goals the project serves, and
not just the economic or technological objectives. If
synergies are identified among stakeholder goals and
interests, they then need to assess if new participants
(e.g., external experts, university researchers, etc.)
or resources need to be added to strengthen these
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Table I. Representation Criteria
Affected Publics Government Industry
Is he/she a member of the affected
community?
Is he/she based in the affected
zone/district/state or known to the
local community?
Is he/she based at the site of local
operations?
Was he/she elected or nominated by the
community?
Does he/she have good knowledge of the
local context — political, social, and
economic?
Is he/she known to the local
community?7
If the individual is a NGO representative
outside the affected community, has
he/she been working closely with the
community?
Does he/she have authority to make
decisions in the local area?
Does he/she have the authority to make
decisions in the local plant?8
Does the NGO representative have good
knowledge of the local context —
political, social, and economic?
Does he/she have influence with the
bureaucracy?
Does he/she have the authority to make




Does he/she have political clout?
Fig. 2. Co-design process.
synergies. If there are no areas of convergence, then
a decision on whether to abandon the project or re-
formulate the project goals can be made through a
vote at by representatives.
3.3. Stage 3: Co-Definition
Co-definition (see Fig. 3) is about integrating
lay knowledge into the risk estimation, evaluation,
and management process by providing a platform for
knowledge to be produced collectively. The main ob-
jectives are to clarify what the problems are and, in
the process, build trust by making uncertainties and
unknowns a central topic of discussion while enlisting
all participants in finding/proposing solutions. The
guiding questions in this stage are thus formulated
as:
1. What are the impacts from a technical perspec-
tive? What do the experts know?
2. What are the impacts from the affected
publics’ perspective? What do the publics
know?
3. What are the unknowns?
This process allows a cross-examination of how
the project impacts will affect the goals and inter-
ests identified in the preceding stage, and reassess
how the larger collective pool of knowledge can help
minimize impacts and maximize benefits. Additional
experts or resources may need to be enlisted to fill
information gaps, provide new insights, or propose
alternatives. If all participants can agree on the set
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Fig. 3. Co-definition process.
of (problem) definitions and potential solutions, de-
liberation can proceed to the next stage of planning.
If there is no agreement, participants have to decide
whether to abandon the project or reevaluate the
problems through a vote at by representatives.
3.4. Stage 4: Co-Planning
With an agreement on the set of definitions and
potential solutions, co-planning (see Fig. 4) focuses
on assigning areas of responsibility and resources to
each stakeholder group. The guiding questions here
are:
 What are the responsibilities of industry and the
resources needed?
 What are the responsibilities of government and
the resources needed?
 What are the responsibilities of affected publics
and the resources needed?
With areas of responsibilities marked out, re-
sources need to be matched to them. These fall un-
der five general categories of human/social capital,
financial, ecological, technology and infrastructure,
and institutional (e.g., local legislation, licenses, gov-
ernment approvals, etc.). If there is agreement on the
pool of resources needed, an assessment should be
made about of whether new participants or resources
need to be brought in to support action, or if existing
resources or expertise can be shared among stake-
holders. If there is conditional agreement, focus needs
to be on what the conditions are; whether new re-
sources or participants need to be enlisted; if existing
resources can be shared; or if representatives need to
make compromises. If there is no agreement, discus-
sions need to turn towards possible compromises or
new sources of capital or support.
Often, disagreements arise from the unequal dis-
tribution of resources. This stage of deliberation,
therefore, is not just about expanding the pool of re-
sources, but also redistributing and sharing existing
ones. If the project goals, risk problems, and respon-
sibilities have been collectively formulated, defined,
and allocated in the preceding stages, stakeholders
would have more shared interests at this stage and
therefore have a greater stake in making the delib-
eration process a success. If, however, an agreement
cannot be reached, then representatives have to vote
on whether to abandon the project, renegotiate re-
sponsibilities and resource allocations, or return to
stage three and reevaluate the definition/scope of the
problem.
3.5. Stage 5: Co-Regulation
Co-regulation (see Fig. 5) is where shared re-
sponsibilities are translated into actionable items
(roles) all stakeholder groups can take as the project
is implemented so that there is shared accountability.
This strengthens postimplementation accountability
by involving affected publics in the entire lifecycle
of the project, drawing on local expertise in the day-
to-day management of risk, and building capacities
in the process. The key components of this phase
are the assignment of roles to respective stakeholder
groups and the identification of deliverables, upon
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Fig. 4. Co-planning process.
which progress can be evaluated. The guiding ques-
tions at this stage are thus formulated as:
1. What are roles of each stakeholder group?
2. What should their deliverables be?
3. What capacities can be built in the process?
Based on the areas of responsibilities and the
pool of resources agreed on in the preceding stage,
the role of each stakeholder group is clarified and
built into the project implementation plan. The
emphasis here is for affected public representatives
to identify areas that they can or would like to
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Fig. 5. Co-regulation process.
participate in. This is also where they can take up the
role as third-party regulators in monitoring aspects
of everyday operations that the corporation may not
have the resources or manpower to do. Should af-
fected publics lack the expertise, technology, or in-
frastructure to fulfil that role, government and indus-
try stakeholders need to provide them with the skills
and tools through workshops, equipment loans, ros-
ters, direct lines of communication, etc. The benefits
of this are twofold: firstly, it helps build capacity and
creates shared ownership of physical components of
the project; secondly, it mitigates situations of regu-
latory capture and poor safety culture that seep into
the everyday operation of the project.
Laying out the deliverables is an important com-
ponent as it provides a way to evaluate progress and
establish accountability by institutionalizing trans-
parency. Importantly, these roles and deliverables
are not fixed. As the project progresses through
the different stages of its lifecycle, they have to be
reevaluated, the responsibilities and resources avail-
able will change, and the scope of problems will
evolve. The network of relevant actors and resources
will shift as the project progresses, when unexpected
events occur, when governments change, when ac-
cumulated ecological effects are unleashed, or when
the actions of one industry affect another. This re-
configuration of the risk landscape and the responses
afforded by this framework are captured in (but
not limited to) some possible scenarios presented in
Table II. However, in the case that representa-



























Table II. Scenarios of Changes in Risk Configuration
Scenario Response
Scenario 1: Unplanned events or
accidents cause impacts to
spread to new geographical




Return to stage 1.
Scenario 2: Interests and goals of
some stakeholders have
changed.
Return to stage 2.
Scenario 3: New knowledge or
information emerges, leading to
the realization that impacts or
risks are greater than previously
estimated.
Return to stage 3,
potentially needing to
return to stage 1 if
new groups are
impacted.
Scenario 4: Government policy
changes, leading to the removal
of subsidies, tighter regulations,
or legislation banning further
developments in the industry.
Return to stage 1.
deliverables, a vote will have to be made on whether
to abandon the project or renegotiate the set of ar-
rangements.
In sum, this framework offers a set of proce-
dures and mechanisms that can be used to start a
deliberative process that provides direct participa-
tion of affected publics; mitigates hijacking by dom-
inant/interest groups through co-selection of repre-
sentatives; embeds public participation throughout
the lifecycle of a project through co-design, co-
planning, and co-regulation; and provides the mech-
anisms at each stage for new participants and re-
sources to be enlisted (i.e., the reconfiguration of
stakeholders), and for problems to be reformulated
and modified.
4. CHALLENGES
There are some conceptual and practical chal-
lenges to this hybrid risk governance framework.
Conceptually, Callon and Latour have been heav-
ily criticized for their agnostic approach to power(44)
and romanticizing the democratization of science and
uncertainty.(45) Indeed, Fuller (2010) contends that
the “stuff of hybrid forums” is more applicable to
groups looking to translate economic might into po-
litical might, while Gross (2011) points to Callon
and colleagues’ aversion to more sinister examples
such as radical Islamist organizations or creationist
movements, and the potential misuse of the versatile
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knowledge produced by hybrid forums. The public is
also not always politically engaged or interested in
participation. Distrust in institutions, class divisions,
epistemic hierarchies, and the disjunction between
future and present needs can cause public aversion
to deliberative processes.(46)
This framework, however, circumvents some of
these challenges by keeping the guiding questions
at each stage open ended and oriented towards co-
defining problems rather than preselecting problems
to be discussed. The representation criteria (Table I)
is also designed to integrate those with poor eco-
nomic and political resources into decision-making
processes and translating their knowledge into activ-
ities and arrangements that can empower them. Nev-
ertheless, the misuse of knowledge produced in such
forums is a potential risk that needs to be captured in
the reflexive components of the framework.
More practically, the framework also faces chal-
lenges in facilitating meaningful public participation
because it hinges significantly on the communication
and conflict resolution skills of the moderator. In-
dustry and (in some cases) government experts may
not consider lay specialist knowledge to be valuable
to the process and reject attempts to collectively de-
fine problems and develop shared responsibilities, re-
sources, and accountabilities. Furthermore, industry
and/or government stakeholders may see this as a
way to “greenwash” industrial projects or co-opt af-
fected communities. Some established power brokers
within the community or lobby groups may also con-
sider these new arrangements as a threat to their po-
sitions of power and resist change.
But hazardous industries, not least nuclear
power, are well acquainted with the heavy price of
public resistance from the rippling effects of disasters
and accidents, delayed operations, forced shutdowns,
expensive and prolonged litigation, and added secu-
rity risks. Added to that, clean-up costs and compen-
sation are often so great that they far outweigh the
cost of more participatory approaches to risk gover-
nance. It is therefore in the self-interest of project
proponents to have meaningful public participation
throughout the project lifecycle.
5. CONCLUSION
This article focused on the mutable nature of
risk problems and acceptability in risk governance
and sought to address it through the hybrid risk
governance framework. This approach deepens the
substantive contribution of affected publics through-
out the lifecycle of a project. It also shifts the goals
of public engagement and deliberation away from
immutable notions of risk problems and acceptable
risk-benefit tradeoffs towards a mutable conception
of evolving risks and “work in progress acceptabil-
ity.” In doing so, affected publics become more than
just passive providers of legitimacy to a project but
active co-regulators and co-producers of knowledge.
Deliberation goes beyond just minimizing risks but
also building local capacities, expanding the scope of
benefits, thereby increasing resilience.
The mutable nature of risk problems and its con-
figuration of stakeholders are built into the process
of deliberation by the reevaluation of relevant par-
ticipants and resources at each stage, and the pro-
vision of pathways back to the different stages of
deliberation when stakeholders fail to reach an
agreement. This reflexive design reinforces the no-
tion that disagreement does not mean the end of de-
liberation, but the reevaluation of the problem and
rearrangement of resources and stakeholders.
The framework itself is, of course, imperfect and
mutable. It will need modifications, elaboration, and
improvements when applied to various (industry, po-
litical, cultural, ecological, etc.) contexts and as re-
search on risk governance develops further. But it
is a first step towards translating the conceptualiza-
tion of risk and acceptability as mutable entities into
a practicable set of arrangements that practitioners of
risk governance can use to better navigate the com-
plex and fluid landscape of risk problems and public
acceptability.
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